

communicate the value of Goldmann's literary sociology at a time of clear political and intellectual need for interventions of Marxist theory in Latin America, Sasso could not count on the infrastructure of resources that students in the advanced countries take for granted. But it is also true that the suppression of political discourse in his work is not just a matter of the accessibility of texts. The political need for a book on Goldmann itself explains the repression of politics in the book. However, by virtue of that repression, and by the very limited resources Sasso had to constitute his critique, Sasso highlights the theoretical issues essential to a proper view of Goldmann. Now exiled to a provincial town in Venezuela for his politics, Sasso deserves credit for having anticipated the careful re-thinking of Goldmann's work that is currently underway in the U.S., England and elsewhere, in an effort to deflate the Althusserian balloon which some Marxist critics have lofted so high. In general, Sasso makes distinctions in the way of analyzing Goldmann's two most representative works that may now contribute to a critical elaboration of Goldmann's most solid accomplishments in terms of the construction of a valid Marxist approach to literature.

From Sue Curry JANSEN (*Clarence, New York*)

William Seagle, *Cato or the Future of Censorship*. A volume in the series *To-day and To-morrow*, (London: Keagan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, 1930).

We children of the cybernetic age forget we did not invent futurism. No Sorokin polices our lapses with lessons from Plato, Augustine, Bacon or Duns Scotus. But, discovery of the yellowed-pages of a remarkable series, *To-day and To-morrow*, published nearly a half-century ago has deflated the pretensions of this "New Columbus." Conceived with the intent of soliciting a diversity of informed opinion, the series includes nearly one hundred volumes with such provocative titles as *Janus or the Conquest of War*, *Vulcan or the Future of Labour*, *The Future of the Sexes*, *Diogenes or the Future of Leisure*, *Icarus or the Future of Science*, *Automation or the Future of the Mechanical Man*, and, of course, *The Future of Futurism*. Contributors include J. B. S. Haldane, Bertrand Russell, J. W. N. Sullivan, William McDougall, Robert Graves, and Rebecca West. Some don the mantle of Cassandra gravely. Others sport it with a wink to Democritus. All display mastery over the craft of writing.

I discovered the series while completing a bibliographic review of the literature on censorship. Dismayed by innumerable tracts in which well-intentioned liberals opened their polemical requests for personal prerogatives with the pious disclaimer, "I do not believe in censorship of any kind, but . . ."; I opened *Cato Or The Future Of Censorship* with deep skepticism. The discovery . . . William Seagle was casually tracing his way back from the side of the dialectic I was still struggling to reach.

According to Seagle's "first principles" censorship is a necessary but often painful precondition of all forms of social organization:

The objectives of censorship have varied to meet the changing character of civilization. But censorship has persisted since man first became a social animal.

The censorship of ideas has been perennial and it is agreed ideas are important. It is unnecessary to bemoan eloquently the great martyrs – Socrates, Jesus, Galileo – who were suppressed in vain. It is the lesser ones who testify to the foolishness of mankind.

He regards the modern tendency to cast arguments against censorship in terms of the sanctity of art as ill-conceived. Areopagicians' self-serving briefs against censorship de-focalize the political nature of all censorship. Politics is censorship. If the state exercises surveillance over art, its interest is self-preservation, not aesthetics. Democracy modifies the form but not the fact of censorship: "The only difference now is that authority is estopped from brutal frankness." "Subterranean censorship" is the metier of the modern state. Overt state censorship is avoided. Pretexts for action are fabricated in which censorship is made incidental to some other purpose: "The post office or custom officials are merely occupied in keeping the mails or commerce pure." Technological advance expands the base of subterranean censorship because capital acts as its own censor.

... it at once means business and organization and the individual becomes subject to greater control. Business also means competition and an appeal to the State to protect the products of the machine, and when the State has once intervened it remains to supervise. The climax of self-censorship has been reached in the huge concentrations of capital represented by the modern newspaper with its great plants of rotating and whirring machines. This is, perhaps, the economic interpretation of the 'freedom of the press.'

The existence of a formula, a system of prohibitions, is more important than its character. Since the late nineteenth century, sexual censorship has become the dominant prescription in industrialized democracies. Within the sexual-industrial complex, therefore, sexual radicalism becomes a symptom of political radicalism. However, Seagle predicts popular acceptance of the principles of Freudianism will gradually bring about a reversal of the formula until the person who "cries 'Obscene!'" will be hurried away to the psychiatric clinic." The primary lesson to be derived from the history of censorship is its constancy. The censorial impulse is rooted in the quest of *homo rationalis* for perfection in an imperfect world. In Seagle's future-imperfect, the following forms of censorship will prevail:

(1) As electronic media are perfected, there will be a tremendous expansion in the scope and effectiveness of subterranean censorship.

Radio television will bring the talkie, the movie, the story, the news, sport, the dance into the home. Homo sapiens will sit in his cave like an insect with antennae. A great part of the distinction between public and private performances will have been destroyed, and there will no longer be both public and private amusements.

(2) The pace of the expansion of capitalistic self-censorship pales in a comparison with the expansion of state censorship which the world's movement toward socialism will precipitate. Seagle believes that the Soviet experience conclusively demonstrates that censorship resulting from monopolistic state control of the means of production tends to be absolute.

(3) For the immediate future, there will be an intensification of censorships deriving from conflicts in the two major world systems' definitions of economic man. However, he regards the economic interpretation of history as a distortion rooted in scarcity.

(4) Affluence will deliver humankind from its constraints to a new censorship:

The last censorship will be a psychological censorship which will last for countless thousands of years. The perfection of the mind of man will be the ruling passion of the governors of society . . . Disease generally will have replaced the concept of crime. It is then that the very word censorship will have disappeared from the language of humanity, and police officials will be known as 'Psychological Comptrollers.'

Although the formula will be extraordinarily complicated, the comptrollers (psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists) will betray their censorial impulses by stratifying humankind into discrete classes of privilege based upon quotients of measurable intelligence in which "The mental Ariels may be free, but certainly not the mental Caliban."

Dusty shelves may affirm the folly of futurism. But, Seagle's yellowed-pages are as anachronistic as the next chapter in the continuing dialogue on the politics of communication.

From Michael S. KIMMEL (*Berkeley, California*)

Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813*, (New York: Knopf, 1977)

This massive yet elegant treatise, which locates the regression of the Netherlands within a larger European context and yet remains fully cognizant of its unique Dutch-ness, is an important book. It is an explicit attempt to understand the processes by which a nationalist revolution promoting the unification of the Netherlands was swept up in the more powerful political currents of late 18th century Europe. Empirically rich and theoretically acute, it is a book useful to specialists in Dutch history, generalists interested in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, and social scientists concerned with general theoretical questions about the processes that make for successful or unsuccessful revolutions. Like most other studies of these "times of trouble" in the Netherlands, Schama first conceived of his book as a study of the Netherlands as a client state of Napoleonic France. But, as with many good historical studies that remain theoretically sensitive, Schama ended up writing